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Abstract: Personal data has both an economic and a dignitary value. This begs the 
question of whether competition law should respect the dual nature of personal 
data, given that the regulation of competition is chiefly dictated by economic 
concerns. This article addresses that question by mapping the potential 
intersections between EU data protection law and competition law. In particular, it 
argues that data protection law exercises an internal and an external constraint on 
competition law. On the one hand, competition law involves judgments about 
‘normal competition’ and consumer welfare which may require a normative 
contribution by data protection law. Using data protection as a normative 
benchmark in this way does not depart from the logic of competition law as data 
protection still requires a competitive concern hook on which to hang. Data 
protection would thus act as an ‘internal constraint’ on competition law. On the 
other hand, regardless of such logic, competition authorities are bound to respect 
the fundamental right to data protection. This requires them to restrict the scope 
of competition law and to guarantee the effectiveness of that fundamental right. In 
this way, data protection acts as an ‘external constraint’ on competition law. 
Recognising these constraints would pave the way for a more coherent EU law 
approach to consumer concerns in a digital society.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Personal data has been described as ‘the oil of the information economy’.1 This 
analogy reflects the economic value of personal data in the digital economy but 
fails to capture that, unlike oil, personal data is intrinsically linked to the dignity, 
autonomy, and privacy of individuals.2 The dual nature of personal data is 
nonetheless now recognised, leading to the inclusion of a right to data protection 
in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter).3 Indeed, the 
challenges that personal data’s duality poses for the regulation of personal data 
processing are evidenced by the protracted debate over the new legislative 
framework for data protection in the European Union (EU).4 It also begs the 
question of whether the dual nature of personal data should also be reflected by in 
EU competition law, given that the regulation of competition is chiefly dictated by 
economic concerns. This article addresses that question by mapping the potential 
intersections between EU data protection law and competition law. In particular, 
it identifies how data protection law may influence the application of competition 
law by the Commission. 
While competition is a well-established area of EU law and policy, the EU 
only first developed a data protection framework in 19955 and this framework has, 
to date, been under-enforced. This may explain why little attention has been paid 
to the relationship between the two fields. Naturally, the growing importance of 
personal data for economic activity has been noted by competition law scholars. 
This is particularly so in the US, although the burgeoning literature there is of 
limited relevance in the EU context given the distinct legal framework and 
institutional arrangements in the EU. From an EU perspective, substantive data 
                                                      
1 See, for instance, the keynote speech of former Commissioner Kuneva, ‘Keynote Speech: Roundtable 
on Online Data Collection, Targeting and Profiling’, Brussels, 31 March 2009, SPEECH/09/156, or 
Patrick Moorhead, ‘Why your Personal Data is the New Oil’, AdAge, 10 November 2011 
(http://adage.com/article/digitalnext/personal-data-oil/230932/).  
2 A better analogy for personal data in a digital economy might be peasant work in agrarian economies, 
since its value is also essential but diffused throughout the society and often without being recognised a 
personal dimension. 
3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01 and [2010] OJ C83/389. 
4 The European Commission proposed a new data protection regulation in January 2012. (European 
Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 final.) Agreement was reached on the final text of 
this regulation almost 4 years later in December 2015 (European Commission, ‘Agreement on 
Commission's EU data protection reform will boost Digital Single Market’, IP/12/46).  
5 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] 
OJ L281/23.  
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protection concerns have been dismissed by competition law practitioners and 
scholars as simply another ‘non-economic’ interest standing outside competition 
law’s analytical methods and policy goals.6 In support of this claim, references are 
made to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU (the Court) in Asnef-
Equifax7, as well as the Commission decision in the Facebook/WhatsApp8 merger, 
where a concurrent application of the two regimes was suggested.  
The influence of data protection (and other fundamental rights) on 
competition law has thus been confined to ensuring respect for certain procedural 
guarantees during the investigation of competitive infringements.9 To the extent 
that competition law must consider markets in which personal data is present, 
competition scholars argue that personal data should be analysed according to its 
economic characteristics, like any other good or service. In this regard, data 
protection regulation would merely set the ‘legal context’ in which competitive 
relationships unfold, and would be no different from other market regulation. For 
their part, data protection advocates have focused on developing the guiding 
principles of their nascent field of law, and have dedicated little attention to its 
interaction with the areas of EU law that preceded it. As shall be outlined below, 
some commonality of goals can be identified between competition and data 
protection law, most evidently the promotion of consumer interests, leading to 
calls by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) for greater cooperation 
between the respective regulators.10 Nevertheless, this also places data protection 
amongst the many policy areas which authors claim should be taken into account 
by competition law under a wide notion of ‘consumer welfare’ – calls which thus 
far remain unheeded.11 
This article argues that competition law allows for influence by data 
protection norms. In particular, it proposes that EU data protection norms may 
impose both an internal and an external constraint on the application of 
competition law. Data protection norms can exercise an ‘internal’ constraint when 
the substantive assessments undertaken pursuant to competition law integrate data 
                                                      
6 See, for instance, Richard Craig, ‘Big Data and competition – merger control is not the remedy for data 
protection issues’, July 2014. Last accessed 3 November 2015, available at: http://united-
kingdom.taylorwessing.com/globaldatahub/article_big_data_competition.html .   
7 C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y Crédito, SL v Asociación de 
Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc) [2006] ECR I-11125. 
8 Facebook/ WhatsApp (Case COMP/M.7217) Commission Decision [2014] OJ C 417/02.  
9 See, for instance, Damien Geradin and Monica Kuschewsky, ‘Competition Law and Personal Data: 
Preliminary Thoughts on a Complex Issue’ (2013), available at SSRN:  
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2216088.  
10 Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Privacy and competitiveness in the 
age of big data: The interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the 
Digital Economy’, March 2014.  
11 See, for instance, Chris Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Hart, 2009).  This does not mean that 
public policy is not effectively taken into account, only that it is has not expressly been under a wide 
notion of consumer welfare. 
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protection considerations and thus, for instance, data protection considerations 
determine whether competition is harmed in markets for, or dependent upon, 
personal data. Data protection norms can exercise an ‘external’ constraint on 
competition law when the Commission is under an obligation to take them into 
consideration due to their relative weight vis-à-vis competition law and other 
policy areas. For example, the procedural guarantees resulting from data 
protection constitute an external constraint which conditions the investigation of 
alleged competition law infringements. Internal constraints would thus fit within 
the pre-established legal confines of competition law, while external constraints 
would override them.   
This article shall proceed as follows. Firstly, it sets out relevant aspects of 
competition and data protection law in part two and briefly highlights the 
common ground shared by both policies. Part three focuses on how data 
protection norms can be incorporated into the analytical framework of 
competition law, notably the existing notion of consumer welfare, and thus exert 
an internal constraint on it. Part four considers whether, beyond this fixed 
framework, aspects of data protection can influence how competition law and 
policy is applied, and thus exercise an external constraint on competition law. The 
discussion on the intersection of data protection and competition law is not of 
interest only to the initiated. This issue exposes fundamental tensions regarding 
the role of personal data in the information society, which go beyond the 
traditional confines of competition or data protection law. It also provides an 
opportunity to observe how the changes to the legal and institutional framework 
brought about the Lisbon Treaty might affect the pre-existing normative 
coherence of different areas of EU law. In this regard, data protection provides an 
excellent case study for consideration of how the EU will integrate the demands 
of fundamental rights protection with its existing enforcement of other policies. 
 
 
 
2.  COMPETITION AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 
IN THE EU 
 
While a detailed description of the legal framework for competition law and data 
protection in the EU is beyond the scope of this article, it is necessary to outline 
their key features (2.1. and 2.2.) and their common characteristics in order to 
understand how the two legal regimes potentially intersect (2.3.). The ancillary role 
of data in the competitive process must also be differentiated from situations 
when personal data itself is the object of competition, in particular as regards 
competition for the acquisition of personal data (2.4.). 
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2.1. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO PERSONAL DATA PROCESSING 
 
Personal data processing in the EU has been regulated for almost two decades, 
with the original Data Protection Directive undergoing its first legislative overhaul 
at present. Once complete, the Directive shall be replaced by a General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR). Despite the lengthy legislative process to enact 
the GDPR, the structure of the legal framework applicable to personal data 
processing will remain largely unchanged. Three key features of this framework 
are noteworthy. First, data protection law in the EU has a broad scope of 
application as a result of the expansive definition of terms such as ‘personal data’ 
and ‘processing’. Personal data is defined as ‘any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable person’ while processing encompasses ‘any operation or 
set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by 
automatic means’.12 The Court has consistently supported the broad scope of 
application of the data protection regime. For instance, in Google Spain13, despite 
the Advocate General’s reservations regarding the Directive’s broad scope, the 
Court adopted a literal – and expansive – interpretation of ‘processing’ in order to 
ensure the Directive would not be deprived of its effect.14 The data protection 
regime does not therefore merely apply to the use or misuse of personal data, the 
mere act of collecting personal data in the first instance is regulated by this 
framework.  
A second key feature of the regime is that, despite the misgivings expressed 
regarding its broad scope, once within its scope personal data processing is not 
necessarily prohibited. This is clear from cases such as Rynes15, where the Court 
interpreted the scope of an exemption to the data protection rules narrowly but 
explicitly indicated that the personal data processing was likely to be legitimate 
once assessed pursuant to the data protection framework. The data protection 
framework could therefore be said to legitimise personal data processing.16 Such 
processing is permissible provided it, first, has a legal basis and, second, complies 
with the safeguards set out in secondary legislation. Of the potential legal bases 
                                                      
12 Directive 95/46 EC (n5) Art 2(a) and (b).  
13 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) and Mario Costeja González ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.  
14 ibid, [29]  
15 Case C-212/13 František Ryneš ECLI:EU:C:2014:2428.  
16 It should be noted that this regime has been classified as ‘prohibitive’ by the UK’s Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) insofar as personal data processing is prohibited unless it is established that 
it falls within a particular ‘gateway’. ICO, ‘Information Commissioner’s Office: Initial Analysis of the 
European Commission’s Proposals for a Revised Data Protection Legislative Framework’, 27 February 
2012, 9. This document has been removed from the ICO website:  
<https://wiki.laquadrature.net/images/1/12/Ico_initial_analysis_of_revised_eu_dp_legislative_proposal
s.pdf> accessed 3 March 2015.  
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listed, the most frequently cited is the consent of the individual ‘data subject’.17 
However personal data processing can also rely on other legal bases in order to be 
lawful. For instance, processing is legitimate if it is necessary for compliance with 
a legal obligation or for the performance of a contract. Much data processing 
conducted online therefore relies not on consent but on a catch-all legal basis 
whereby processing is legitimate provided that it is ‘necessary for the purposes of 
the legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or by a third party or parties 
to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject’.18 In addition to 
having a legal basis for data processing, a number of safeguards for personal data 
processing must also be complied with in order for data processing to be 
legitimate. For instance, personal data must be processed ‘fairly and lawfully’19 and 
be ‘adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
are collected and/or further processed’.20 Provided these criteria are respected, 
personal data processing is permitted.  
Through this framework, data protection legislation functions as a system of 
checks and balances which determines the boundary between permissible and 
impermissible personal data processing and, in so doing, reconciles individual 
rights and other societal interests. Nevertheless, the third key feature of the data 
protection regime is that it is a rights-based framework. This is evident in two 
ways. First, the data protection regime grants individuals subjective rights over 
their personal data, for instance, the right to information regarding the processing 
of their personal data21, the right to delete personal data in certain circumstances22 
and the right to access personal data.23 Secondly, the legislative framework was 
bolstered by the Charter, Article 8 of which sets out a right to data protection in 
addition to the right to privacy set out in Article 7, thereby consolidating the role 
of individual rights at the heart of the EU data protection law regime.  
 
2.2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 
 
Competition law is concerned with preserving the competitive process, under the 
assumption that this process is the most efficient way to promote consumer 
welfare, guarantee economic freedom and achieve market integration. These goals 
cannot be achieved through competition law alone – for example, market 
integration is the focus of much of EU law. Competition law plays its part in 
                                                      
17 Directive 95/46 EC (n5) Art 7(a).  
18 ibid, Art 7(f).  
19 ibid, Art 6(1)(a).  
20 ibid, Art 6(1)(c). 
21 ibid, Arts 10 and 11.  
22 ibid, Art 12(b).  
23 ibid, Art 12(a).  
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achieving these goals by focusing on economic activity and making sure that the 
agents of this activity – ‘undertakings’ – do not harm competition. Roughly 
speaking, competition law approaches the problem of establishing harm to 
competition in two stages. First, it identifies certain actions which might raise 
competitive concerns. Secondly, it applies tailored tests to these actions depending 
upon the particular concern at issue. These two stages are primarily governed by 
open-textured, negatively-framed Treaty provisions.  
The first of these provisions, Article 101 TFEU, prohibits collusion between 
undertakings (‘agreements’, ‘concerted practices’ and ‘decisions by associations of 
undertakings’) which have as their ‘object or effect’ the restriction of competition. 
According to the Court, restrictions by object are those ‘that can be regarded, by 
their very nature, as being harmful to the proper functioning of normal 
competition’.24 This definition points to an essential normative incompatibility 
between the conduct concerned and the goals of competition law, which is 
assessed by judging the objectives pursued by undertakings in their economic and 
legal context. The most notable example is undertakings agreeing to abstain from 
competing between themselves by fixing prices or sharing markets through 
‘cartels’.25 However, as discussed below, other restrictions by object involve a 
more detailed analysis of what constitutes a departure from ‘normal competition’. 
In contrast, restrictions by effect are based on negative effects on competition.26 
Whether such effects result, or are likely to result, from particular conduct is a 
factual assessment also based on the economic and legal context in which the 
undertakings operate. 
The second provision is Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits the ‘abuse’ by an 
undertaking of its ‘dominant position’. A dominant position has been defined as 
the ability to behave independently of competitors and consumers, and is 
presumed when an undertaking has a market share of over 50% in a relevant 
market.27 Market share is an indication of the market power of an undertaking, 
and this market power in turn may depend on the existence of market barriers that 
confer a competitive advantage on the undertaking and are hard to replicate by 
competitors. It is substantial market power which makes the actions of dominant 
undertakings potentially more harmful for competition than those of non-
dominant undertakings, hence the ‘special responsibility’ imposed by the case law 
on dominant undertakings.28 In practice, this means that while achieving a 
dominant position is not prohibited, some actions that would otherwise be 
permissible will be prohibited. Those actions have been identified by the case law 
as specific abuses, which are usually grouped around two main competitive 
concerns: exclusion and exploitation. Exclusion refers to harm to competitors 
                                                      
24 Case C‑67/13 Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204, [50].   
25 ibid, [51].  
26 Case C-382/12 MasterCard Inc. and Others v European Commission [2014] ECR nyr [93].    
27 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359 [60].  
28 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECR I-0000. 
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which does not arise through ‘competition on the merits’, such as exit from the 
market or stunted development.29 Exploitation refers to harm to consumers, such 
as charging excessive prices or imposing unfair conditions. Tests to identify such 
abuses have been set out in the jurisprudence of the Court, and it is common for 
behaviour to be considered abusive on several counts. 
Merger control is an additional concern of competition policy. This is 
regulated by the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), which applies to concentrations: 
mergers and other ways of acquiring control over undertakings. Concentrations 
beyond certain thresholds are notified to the Commission, which can prohibit 
them (or impose conditions) if they ‘significantly impede effective competition’.30 
The test set out in the EUMR is whether the concentration may, ‘in particular’, 
result in ‘the creation or strengthening of a dominant position’.31 This reflects the 
origin of merger control as an abuse under Article 102 TFEU concerned with the 
exclusion of competitors through their acquisition and the consequent creation of 
exploitable market power – a rationale that still remains.32 However, merger 
control is now centred on prospective effects to the structure of the market, 
which are estimated by the Commission by defining the relevant markets and 
analysing the removal of competitive constraints on the merged entity.33  
It should be noted that the competition law provisions do not provide the 
Commission with a general competence to regulate or shape particular markets. 
Yet, the exercise of the Commission’s competences may have such an effect, 
particularly if undertakings avoid an enforcement decision by offering 
commitments to remedy an alleged violation of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, or agree 
to criteria set out by the Commission in order to ensure that a notified merger is 
given clearance. Neither does the TFEU provide the Commission with particular 
guidance on the exercise of its competences on competition, which has led to the 
gradual emergence of ‘consumer welfare’ as the focus its enforcement. This 
enforcement shall, according to the Commission, seek to deliver direct benefits to 
consumers such as ‘lower prices, better quality and a wider choice of new or 
improved goods and services’.34 The Court has acknowledged the benefits of 
                                                      
29 The Court has stated that ‘competition on the merits’ does not prevent the exclusion of less efficient 
undertakings, insofar as these undertakings provide a less attractive to consumers in terms of price, 
quality, choice and innovation.  
30 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L24/1, Art 2(3).  
31 Ibid.  
32 Case C-6/72 Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215.  
33 This paper will concentrate on non-coordinated effects: Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ 
C31/5 [22-38].  
34 See, for instance, Communication, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] C45/7, 5.  
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applying competition law to achieve consumer welfare (defined in this way), but 
has refused to give the consumer welfare standard priority over other goals of 
competition law, such as the protection of competition itself and market 
integration.35 It will be seen below that the formulation of consumer welfare by 
the Court and the Commission is particularly important for present purposes. 
 
2.3. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF DATA PROTECTION AND COMPETITION LAW 
 
The reform of the EU data protection framework has provided an opportunity for 
the data protection community to look to other legal frameworks for inspiration. 
It has been noted that data protection has much to learn from the elaborate 
procedural framework for the enforcement of Competition law, and suggested 
that the coherence of the EU legal order requires similar sanctions for data 
protection law as those administered by competition authorities.36 However, 
beyond this potential for procedural convergence, the two legal regimes appear to 
have little in common from a substantive perspective. The only evident point of 
convergence is that both data protection and competition law pursue market 
integration as an objective. The enactment of the Data Protection Directive was 
premised on Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 100a EC), a provision which allows the 
EU legislature to adopt measures to approximate national laws provided they have 
as their objective the ‘establishment and functioning of the internal market’.37 
Data protection legislation is therefore an instrument of positive integration as it 
introduced data protection legislation in Member States where there was none 
and, in its capacity as an instrument of maximum harmonisation38, minimised the 
divergences between existing legislation in other Member States.39  Similarly, 
competition law seeks to achieve market integration, albeit through negative 
integration, by ensuring that undertakings do not partition the market through 
mechanisms such as territorial allocation, restrictions on exports or on parallel 
trade.40  
Another commonality of data protection and competition law is that both 
share a concern for the consumer. In addition to the objective of ensuring the free 
                                                      
35 See, for instance, C501/06 GlaxoSmithKline Services Ltd v Commission [2009] ECR I-09291, or Case C-
8/08, T-Mobile [2009] ECR I-04529.   
36 See, D Kloza and A Moscibroda, ‘Making the case for enhanced enforcement cooperation between 
data protection authorities: insights from competition law’ (2014) 4(2) International Data Privacy Law 120.  
37 The Directive’s explanatory memorandum identified cross-border data flows for business purposes as 
one of several areas in which the free flow of personal data between EU Member States was necessary. 
Commission Communication on the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal 
data in the Community and Information Security COM(90) 314 final, 16.  
38 Asnef-Equifax (n7).   
39 For a comprehensive overview of the use of negative integration in the Internal Market, see Catherine 
Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (4th edn, OUP, 2013). 
40 This is a long-standing objective. See, Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs v. 
Commission [1966] ECR 299.  
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flow of personal data between Member States, data protection seeks to ‘protect 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their 
right to privacy’.41 This emphasis on individual rights has been reinforced by the 
inclusion of a fundamental right to data protection in the Charter while the 
Commission’s preference for ‘consumer welfare’ as an enforcement priority also 
places individuals at the heart of the competition law regime.42 This shared 
concern prompted calls by the EDPS for convergence in the application of the 
two regimes.43 However, as consumer protection law is distinguished from 
competition law, and data protection is often treated as a subset of consumer 
protection law, the two can also be distinguished in this regard. For instance, 
Ohlhausen and Okuliar suggest that the substantive concerns of both are 
distinct44: they argue that ‘antitrust laws are focused on broader macroeconomic 
harms, mainly the maintenance of efficient price discovery in markets, whereas the 
consumer protection laws are preoccupied with ensuring the integrity of each 
specific contractual bargain’.45 Or, as Averitt and Lande put it, antitrust caters for 
the availability of consumer choice while consumer law provides consumers with 
the relevant information for the effective exercise of this choice.46 From this 
perspective, data protection and competition law intervene to influence market 
conduct at different levels of the same spectrum.47 Competition law applies to 
correct market failures that are external to the individual, such as reduced choice 
and increased prices, while data protection law applies to correct internal failings, 
such as information and power asymmetries.48 The fact that market failures can 
                                                      
41 Directive 95/46 (n5) Art 1(1).  
42 As shall be discussed below, the Court has refused to allow this economic, consumer-based standard to 
prevail over Competition law’s market integration objective. 
43 Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS (n10) [6].  
44 Indeed, although competition and consumer protection enforcement both fall under the auspices of 
the FTC in the United States (US), it has been argued that there are institutional impediments to their 
converged enforcement. See further, Maureen K Ohlhausen and Alexander Okuliar, ‘Competition, 
Consumer Protection, and the Right (Approach) to Privacy’ (February 6, 2015). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561563 . 
45 ibid, 39.  
46 Averitt and Lande, ‘Using the “consumer choice” approach to antitrust law’ (2007) 74 Antitrust Law 
Journal 176.  
47 On the intersection of competition law and data protection law see Albertina Albors-Llorens, 
‘Competition and Consumer Law in the European Union: Evolution and Convergence’ (2014) Yearbook 
of European Law 1.   
48 The EDPS has stated, to the contrary, that ‘refusal of access to personal information and opaque or 
misleading privacy policies may justify a new concept of consumer harm for competition enforcement in 
digital economy’. Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS (n10) [26]. Nonetheless, as developed below, the 
influence of data protection on competition law can operate without a reworking of the notion of 
consumer welfare. 
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also result from a power asymmetry – the market power held by some 
undertakings – is another possible source of shared concerns.  
 
2.4. THE ROLE OF PERSONAL DATA IN THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 
 
The competitive process is, and always has been, driven by data: market decisions 
require information about prices of goods and services, input availability, 
competitor reactions and consumer preferences. The digital revolution has altered 
the scale of such data gathering and treatment, and the ease with which it can be 
undertaken. Personal data can therefore support competition in goods or services 
in a typical ancillary role. The most relevant example is consumer preferences: data 
about the needs and tastes attributable to individual consumers (or data from 
which these needs and tastes can be inferred) may enhance competition for certain 
goods or services.49 Another example of this ancillary role is how data regarding 
the creditworthiness of individuals would constitute personal data processing 
relevant for the provision of financial services, such as lending.50 However, in 
addition to this ancillary role, personal data can also be a commodity: a good in 
itself, for which there is supply and demand. The commodification of personal 
data is one of the defining characteristics of the ‘digital revolution’. Without 
personal data as an input some goods and services are now ostensibly impossible 
to produce, leading to the growth of commodity markets for personal data. Thus, 
personal data is a full-fledged factor of production in a modern economy. When 
considering personal data as a commodity, it is useful to keep two of its alleged 
attributes in mind: its value is context-dependent, and its value may increase in a 
non-linear fashion up to a certain tipping point once aggregated (because data 
linking leads to additional insights). 
Two potential conclusions follow regarding the role of personal data in the 
competitive process. First, as a commodity, personal data can, like any other 
goods or services, be the object of the competitive process: undertakings compete 
to acquire and sell personal data. Secondly, as an input, personal data can 
constitute a barrier to market entry: undertakings may not be able to replicate or 
acquire the personal data necessary to compete.51 Nevertheless, it has been argued 
that personal data should not be treated as a market barrier. In support of this 
proposition, it is argued that, given its non-rivalrous nature personal data can be 
held or used by many simultaneously without losing its value. It is also argued that 
individuals tend to ‘multi-home’ online using several data-collecting applications 
simultaneously for distinct purposes. In theory therefore, a market barrier could 
                                                      
49 It should also be noted that consumers can themselves be undertakings, for example distributors in a 
supply chain. Article 101 TFEU does not apply to agreements with final consumers, but abuses under 
Article 102 TFEU are not likewise limited. 
50 Asnef-Equifax (n7).   
51 For instance, the Financial Times removed its application from the app store as it needed direct access 
to consumers in order to monetise its content. 
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be overcome by attracting consumers to acquire data from them directly, or by 
purchasing personal data as a commodity on secondary markets. It is nonetheless 
important to bear in mind that data protection limits how undertakings handle 
data. Therefore, any trading of personal data must take into consideration that a 
legal basis is needed for this transfer and for the subsequent processing (this may, 
for instance, require the renewed consent of the individual).52 Whether there is a 
market for personal data as a commodity or personal data acts as a market barrier 
for producing other goods and services is part of the definition of the relevant 
market(s) using standard economic methods.  
The value of personal data puts undertakings that have direct access to 
individuals in a key position in the digital economy, as they can gather personal 
data directly from them. The analogy of personal data with oil, although flawed, 
fully applies to the economic value of the extractive procedure. The OECD has 
recognised that access to customers is critical in so-called data ecosystems. 
Therefore, the competitive process for data acquisition deserves special attention. 
Often, a service will be offered for free-at-the-point-of-access (or against a token 
payment) with the user agreeing to have his or her personal data processed by the 
service provider. The service provider then uses this personal data to profile the 
individual and sell targeted advertising opportunities to third parties. This is an 
example of a ‘two-sided market’, where positive network effects are provided 
across the sides involved: the greater the number of users that disclose their 
personal data, the more the undertaking will be able to monetise it. It can also be 
argued, more doubtfully, that there is a positive effect in the reverse direction: the 
more advertising sold, the better the free services provided.53  
This business model leads to competition for the acquisition of personal data 
(in the form of more users), which prompts the question: what factors are relevant 
to how undertakings compete in these markets? As services are provided for free-
at-the-point-of-access, the traditional tools of market definition based on price 
competition are difficult to apply. Therefore, these markets have been defined 
based on the functionalities of the services offered – which are implicitly assumed 
to depend on the revenues from the advertising-side, so that relevant competition 
would happen in relation to this advertising-side.54 This approach does not fully 
incorporate the preferences of the user, notably the concern for data protection 
and privacy.55 The side of the market for the acquisition of personal data can 
                                                      
52 It has been suggested by the EDPS that consent is limited to the relevant market. However, consent 
should not be dependent on the external factors which condition market definition or on the notion of 
undertaking. 
53 This is not necessarily reflected on all the users: some users may withhold their personal data and still 
benefit from the services. 
54 Facebook/WhatsApp (n8) [88] and [147]. 
55 There may also be a negative network effect at work in these double-sided markets: the more data is 
monetised (for instance, by receiving more personalised advertising), the more reluctant he and she may 
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therefore be defined, on the demand-side, based on what undertakings are willing 
to offer for such data: both the positive (the free service) and the potentially 
negative (the monetisation). 
It follows that several factors influence how undertakings compete for the 
acquisition of personal data, including the service offered and the conditions for 
the treatment of personal data – what shall be called the undertaking’s data use 
policy. There is no fixed relationship between these factors. Users may only care 
about the service provided, ignoring whether and how their personal data is 
treated. In that case, there is only competition on the service. Conversely, the data 
use policy – encompassing factors such as the quantity and nature of the personal 
data processed and the uses to which that data is put – may influence users as 
much or more than the service provided. In that situation, there is competition on 
data use policy: the undertaking that offers the best policy will attract the most 
users.56  
Users may also be sensitive to these factors to different extents.57 For 
instance, users may be wary of the treatment of their data but reluctant to switch 
provider and lose the benefits of a large user base.58 To what extent undertakings 
compete on the basis of their data use policies is an empirical question tackled by 
market definition. Nevertheless, concerns about the treatment of personal data 
will rarely be completely absent. Users are not required to have perfect knowledge 
of that treatment for such concerns to be influential, as most real markets are 
subject to information asymmetries and biases – indeed, expressing a preference 
for privacy might itself be a behavioural bias.59 This is the so-called ‘privacy 
paradox’: while many users express concerns about privacy, few actually act on 
them.60 Nevertheless, from a competitive point of view, those few are enough for 
significant competition to exist. All that is necessary to form a separate market 
defined by competition on data use policy is to be able to differentiate concerned 
                                                                                                                                         
be to disclose personal data. The possibility of such negative effects being meaningful is heavily 
dependent on the consumer being aware of the monetisation and being able to act by changing providers, 
which will of course vary according to the market. 
56 There can be similar competition for the acquisition of any good or service, not just personal data: for 
example, companies compete to attract the best professionals through their work policies, enticing them 
with career development and pay packages. 
57 Market definition in this context may also be difficult, since it is a static exercise that is based on a 
snapshot of the current usage of personal data while personal data is constantly being put to new uses, 
which may be both more innovate and more intrusive for individuals. 
58 Stickiness is one of many factors, including network effects, which can enable a provider to achieve 
scale. See further, Chris Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington, ‘Free Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s 
Most Popular Price’ (2014) 61 UCLA Law Review 606.  
59 Humphreys remarked that privacy concerns may be a reaction against feelings of ‘invasive monitoring’ 
due to the data immersion on contemporary life. Stephen Humphreys, ‘Conscience in the datasphere’, 
LSE Working Papers 11/2015. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613310. 
60 See, for instance, I Cofone, ‘The Value of Privacy: Keep the Money Where the Mouth Is’, RILE 
Working Paper Series No 2014/15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2541214.  
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users from the others – and, by definition, the data subjects are identified or 
identifiable.61 Even if such a market does not presently exist due to the reluctance 
of undertakings to engage in competition on data use policy, potential consumer 
demand would also be enough.62 
 
 
 
3. DATA PROTECTION AS AN INTERNAL CONSTRAINT ON 
COMPETITION LAW 
 
Personal data can be the object of the competitive process, as a commodity, or it 
can influence competition for other goods or services. Competition law therefore 
applies to personal data when it is used or traded as an input or commodity. Thus 
far, it has been generally assumed that competition law would apply in the same 
way as it would to any other input or commodity and that data protection rules 
would not influence this assessment. In Asnef-Equifax, the Court was asked to 
consider whether an exchange of information between banks about potential bank 
borrowers was restrictive of competition. In finding that there was no restriction, 
the Court made its clearest statement yet regarding the interaction between 
competition law and data protection law. It declared that ‘any possible issues 
relating to the sensitivity of personal data are not, as such, a matter for 
competition law, they may be resolved on the basis of the relevant provisions 
governing data protection’.63 Similarly, in Google/Doubleclick64, the Commission 
examined the competitive implications of Google’s acquisition of Doubleclick, a 
company specialising in the delivery of third party advertising solutions, including 
the competitive implications of combining Google and Doubleclick’s existing 
datasets. The Commission explicitly noted that its decision ‘refers exclusively to 
the appraisal of this operation with Community rules on competition’.65 Thus, the 
Commission appears to exclude data protection considerations from competition 
law assessments in the context of ex ante merger control while the Court has 
ostensibly excluded such considerations from the ex post assessment of a 
suspected infringement of Article 101 TFEU. 
Data protection law therefore seems to provide no normative guidance for 
competition law assessments.  While competition law must take account of data 
protection legislation to the extent that it provides the relevant legal context in 
markets for personal data, this is merely descriptive of competitive conditions. 
                                                      
61 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition 
law Privacy enhancing technologies are another way to identify consumers concerned with privacy. 
62 Case C418/01, IMS Health v NDC Health [2004] ECR I-5039.  
63 Asnef-Equifax (n7) [63].  
64 Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick. 
65 Ibid, 368.   
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When it comes to substantive assessments, whether there is also an infringement 
of the data protection regime appears to be irrelevant. Data protection issues are 
therefore ostensibly to be settled concurrently to competition law issues, with the 
two legal regimes running in parallel. For instance, in Asnef-Equifax the Court 
noted that the data-sharing arrangement appeared to satisfy the requirements of 
national data protection legislation.66 The Commission also remarked in 
Google/Doubleclick that its decision was ‘without prejudice to the obligations 
imposed onto the parties by Community [data protection] legislation’.67 Had 
undertakings on these occasions failed to observe such obligations, it seems that 
this would have been a question (or problem) of data protection law rather than 
an issue that could influence the competition law assessment.  
In this article, it is suggested that the boundaries between data protection and 
competition law are not so impervious, and that there are circumstances in which 
data protection can provide a relevant normative benchmark for competition law. 
This normative influence can be distinguished from situations where competition 
law achieves objectives which data protection law would look favourably upon, 
such as preventing discrimination facilitated by personal data processing or 
controlling market power which could be leveraged to extract consent for 
personal data processing. In such situations, there is no need for data protection’s 
normative influence: these objectives can be achieved by applying methods already 
used by competition law. This normative influence can also be distinguished from 
situations where, using the reasoning of the Wouters case law, data protection 
considerations could exempt what would otherwise constitute a restriction of 
competition under Article 101 TFEU. The role of data protection in such a 
situation would be to preclude the ordinary application of competition law, 
explored below as an external constraint, rather than to act as a normative 
benchmark for its interpretation.  
This section will be dedicated to internal constraints: situations where data 
protection could influence a substantive assessment by interacting with 
competition law’s own normative values. Contrary to indications that the 
application of the two regimes is separate and concurrent, it is argued that data 
protection can contribute to the identification and resolution of competitive 
concerns. While the two regimes might apply concurrently, they may not always 
do so separately: competition law may internalise a normative judgment 
originating in data protection, regardless of the consequences under the data 
protection regime.68 As shall be seen, competition law has already made 
infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU dependent on assessments pursuant 
to other fields of law. It is important to recall that data protection and competition 
                                                      
66 Asnef-Equifax (n7) 63.  
67 Google/Doubleclick (n64) 368.  
68 In this regard, concurrent application would facilitate the internalisation described below insofar as 
there would be no precedence of other values over data protection, as it happens when an issue affects 
internal market and competition. Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921 
                        25/2015 
 
 16 
law share important concerns about market integration, consumer welfare and 
power asymmetries. Thus, if there are circumstances when data protection can 
point to obstacles to market integration, or help to identify consumer 
mistreatment or coercion, competition law might listen. 
This shall be illustrated with reference to competition on the quality of data 
use policies. The EDPS has referred to a similar notion: fostering privacy as a 
competitive advantage.69 It will be argued (more broadly) that when the conditions 
for the treatment of personal data are a competitive parameter, the data protection 
regime might provide a normative yardstick for assessments of quality.  
When competition is touted as a way to promote consumer welfare, this 
refers to how competition between undertakings improves the goods and services 
that they offer on the market. Consumer welfare is enhanced when goods and 
services become better, cheaper, and more plentiful. The way in which 
undertakings compete, however, varies according to the market. Although 
undertakings will attempt to provide the overall ‘best’ offer, it is possible to 
differentiate between competitive parameters: typically price, choice, quality and 
innovation. The existence of different competitive parameters is a well-established 
notion in competition law. For example, in Post Danmark I, the Court stated that:  
 
‘Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the 
market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less 
attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, 
choice, quality or innovation’.70 
 
Similarly, the Commission has justified its focus on consumer welfare as an 
enforcement priority by stating that ‘[c]onsumers benefit from competition 
through lower prices, better quality and a wider choice of new or improved goods 
and services’.71 In addition to these recent endorsements, competitive parameters 
make scattered appearances in the (non-exhaustive) examples of restrictions of 
competition and abuses of dominance in the letter of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Although the wording of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU does not provide a 
hierarchy of competitive parameters, the application of competition law has 
tended to focus on price. The reason for this  rests largely on the mathematisation 
of the underlying economics of competition law, and partially because of the 
strong causal connection between price increases and consumer harm. However, 
one cannot escape what Ezrachi and Stucke call ‘the significant, yet elusive nature 
of quality’: on the one hand, it is widely acknowledged that quality is often more 
                                                      
69 Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS (n10) [33]. Ohlhausen and Okuliar also mention competition ‘on 
consumer privacy protections’ as an avenue for applying US antitrust, Ohlhausen and Okuliar, 
Competition, Consumer Protection, and the Right (Approach) to Privacy (n44) 17. 
70 Post Danmark I (n28) 22.  
71 Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 TFEU (n34) 5.  
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important than price; on the other, it is hard to define quality – let alone measure 
it.72 As these authors highlight, despite the difficulty in defining quality there are 
several decisions, in the EU and beyond, supporting the importance of quality as a 
competitive parameter. Therefore, from a theoretical (and occasionally practical) 
point of view, competition assessments based on a decrease of quality are just as 
legitimate as their equivalents based on an increase in price.73 
This may very well happen when, as discussed above, there is competition 
between undertakings for the acquisition of personal data. In markets where such 
data is disclosed in exchange for access to services which are free-at-the-point-of-
access (or for a token fee), there are indications that some consumers are 
influenced by the undertaking’s data use policy.74 Thus, the quality of the data use 
policy of each undertaking can become a competitive parameter relevant to the 
acquisition of personal data. In other words, as undertakings do not pay a 
monetary fee for this data, they are competing on the quality of the service offered 
as a counterpart, including the quality of their data use policy. Yet, as in other 
markets for goods and services, it is difficult to define quality in this regard: what 
makes one data use policy better than another? The variables are numerous: the 
amount of personal data, its nature and sensitivity, the possible uses of the data, 
whether it can be processed by third parties, the third parties uses, etc. As the 
Commission noted in its Intel decision, there may be no single factor defining 
quality.75 
We shall therefore consider how data protection may serve as a normative 
yardstick for assessing the quality of a data use policy, as competition law 
otherwise lacks the normative tools for this assessment. By way of comparison, 
when competition law is faced with price-fixing cartels or exploitative prices it has 
the normative tools – from its economic rationale – to judge the price increase to 
be anti-competitive. When it comes to the conditions offered for personal data, 
competition law can start from a similar premise that quality losses are bad but it 
cannot determine what exactly constitutes such quality. It must be emphasised 
that this assessment – of the quality of a data use policy – is not conducted by 
reference to what consumers want (an issue considered when defining the relevant 
market). Even when consumers are charged collusive or exploitative prices, they 
                                                      
72 Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke, ‘The Curious Case of Competition and Quality’ [2015] Journal of 
Antitrust Enforcement, 2015, 1. These authors indicate some of the heuristics used to overcome that 
difficulty, namely the assumption that competition increases quality for a given price (like it reduces 
prices for a given level of quality) or the price-quality correlation which consumers usually make. Ibid, 2. 
73 What the Court presently refers to ‘competition on the merits’ was even named ‘competition on the 
basis of quality’ in France Télécom. Case C-202/07, France Telecom SA v Commission [2009] ECR I-2369, 
[106]. 
74 Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS (n10) [33]. See also the references to users switching away from 
WhatsApp after news of its acquisition by Facebook, as discussed below. Facebook/Whatsapp (n8) fn. [79] 
and [174] 
75 Case COMP/37.990, Intel, Commission decision of 13May 2009 [1691].  
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pay for a good or service they want and pay what they believe it is worth to 
them.76 It is competition law which intervenes normatively to find those prices to 
be anti-competitive.77 In contrast, competition law cannot judge when there is an 
equally anti-competitive loss of quality in data use conditions. It could, however, 
borrow this normative judgment from the data protection regime. At its essence, 
data protection establishes a framework for judging the treatment of personal 
data, with some practices deemed desirable and others not. Competition law could 
therefore make quality assessments in tandem with data protection.78 
The following sub-sections will consider how this might work in practice, as 
well as possible objections to the use of data protection in this way, in relation to 
restrictions of competition under Article 101 TFEU (3.1.), abuses of dominance 
under Article 102 TFEU (3.2.), and merger control under the EUMR (3.3.). 
 
3.1. RESTRICTIONS OF COMPETITION 
 
Restrictions by object under Article 101 TFEU are characterised ‘by their very 
nature, as being harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition’, with 
the Court further acknowledging that horizontal collusion normally leads to 
negative effects on quality.79 An infringement of data protection law, in particular 
one which leads to lower quality processing of personal data, might therefore 
constitute a restriction of competition by object. If there is competition on data 
use conditions, industry collusion to set those conditions at a level which leads to 
an infringement of data protection law would effectively put a stop to that 
competition.80 The same reasons that make (other) cartels harmful to competition 
would apply here; in particular, there will be a loss of consumer welfare insofar as 
data protection law aims to protect data subjects. In this regard, it would not 
matter if all the consumers affected actually care about data protection, in the 
same way that they do not have to care about cartels: if there is competition on 
data conditions, such collusion is considered normatively censurable.  
Establishing a restriction by object based on a data protection infringement 
would provide a simple and normatively well-grounded bright line which 
                                                      
76 That is demonstrated in the demand curve modelled by economists for any market. 
77 For various economic reasons that converge on the harmfulness of monopolies, from the inefficiency 
of reduced output and rent seeking to the transfer of surplus away from the consumer. 
78 Although this section focuses on quality, a similar discussion could also apply to the competitive 
parameters of choice and innovation. The data protection regime may indicate that a wider breadth of 
competing data protection policies is preferable (regardless of differing quality and price), or encourage 
new improvements and functionalities of data protection that may themselves result in cheaper prices, 
more choice or better quality. 
79 CB (n24) [51]. 
80 This could also extend to limiting competitive parameters along a single vertical relationship – what is 
called, in relation to price, ‘resale price maintenance’. 
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competition law would otherwise, on its own, be unable to draw. It would also 
place restrictions by effect below that line, as losses of quality which do not 
involve such an infringement. This does not however mean that the data 
protection regime would be irrelevant when assessing whether there is a restriction 
by effect. While data protection law allows data processing to be categorised as 
permissible or impermissible, it also provides broader normative indications about 
the desirable treatment of personal data. For example, incomplete information or 
weak consent may be enough to constitute a decrease in quality without 
constituting an infringement of the data protection regime. Establishing a 
restriction of competition in this way would be a more difficult exercise; however, 
restrictions by effect are in any event more difficult to prove in practice than 
restrictions by object.81 This being said, this sub-section will focus on restrictions 
by object, since basing them on data protection would already be an innovative 
development and, in turn, open the way for a more refined analysis of effects.  
The best way to test the merits of this idea is to consider the objections it 
might raise. The most immediate objection is novelty: it could be argued that 
Article 101 TFEU has never been dependent on another field of law. This, the 
argument would go, would imperil the independence of competition law as a field 
of law with its own normative judgments. More practically, it could be argued that 
one difficult assessment – the quality of a data use policy – would simply be 
replaced by another– whether there has been an infringement of data protection 
law. Nevertheless, similar considerations did not deter the Court from relying on 
another field of law to find a restriction by object in Allianz Hungária.82 In that 
judgment, the Court assessed whether agreements between insurance companies 
and dealers constituted a restriction by object by relying wholly on the 
independence of dealers mandated by domestic law.83 This law was an essential 
indicator of the ‘proper functioning of normal competition’: Article 101 TFEU 
was otherwise not normatively equipped to assess the quality of dealer services to 
which consumers were entitled. 
A further line of objection could point to the precedent established by the 
Court in Asnef-Equifax when it stated that issues of personal data are not ‘a matter 
for competition law’ but for the data protection regime.84 It is nonetheless 
suggested that Asnef-Equifax may be limited to its facts. First, there was ostensibly 
no data protection infringement: if the hypothesis is that such an infringement 
could be internalised by Article 101 TFEU, it can only be tested if there is an 
infringement. In Asnef-Equifax, the Court seemed content to confirm that national 
data protection legislation was being respected.85 More importantly, there is no 
                                                      
81 Mastercard (n26) [93] A restriction of competition by effect was described in Mastercard as an ‘adverse 
impact on the parameters of competition, such as […] quality of the goods or services’.  
82 C-32/11, Allianz Hungária Biztosító and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:160.  
83 Allianz Hungária (n80) [47]. 
84 Asnef-Equifax (n7) [63] 
85 ibid.  
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indication in the judgment that the banks were competing for customers based on 
the quality of their data use policies. In the relationship between competition on 
the service provided – lending – and competition on data protection conditions, 
the former appears to subsume the latter. This impression could prove erroneous: 
if equipped with knowledge or awareness, borrowers might object to the sharing 
of their personal data between banks. Nevertheless, this line of inquiry was not 
pursued by the Court, potentially because its inquiry was limited by the facts raised 
before it. The Court therefore found that there was no restriction by object as 
there seemed to be no competitive concern, and such concern is a prerequisite for 
internalising a data protection infringement.86 It could be countered that 
competition on data use policies did exist, but any concern about the quality of 
such policies was trumped by the interest in securing the provision of credit 
against potential defaulting borrowers – thereby showing data protection’s 
competitive irrelevance. However, these two interests were not squared against 
each other either. Thus, in the absence of an infringement affecting competition 
on data use policies, the question of the competitive relevance of data protection 
remains unresolved by Asnef-Equifax. 
The final objection would be that internalising data protection would drag 
competition law away from its core normative concerns. In other words, Article 
101 TFEU would be applied to safeguard the quality of data protection regardless 
of an overall detrimental effect on other competitive parameters or on the 
efficient functioning of the market. These concerns must however be placed in 
context, as a data protection infringement would only matter if there would be 
competition on data processing conditions – an opportunity which, as just noted, 
Asnef-Equifax failed to explore. If a restriction of competition on quality is present, 
it is doubtful that it is efficient or that a trade-off with other competitive 
parameters is allowed.87 As Ezrachi and Stucke note, and is evident in relation to 
cartels, ‘competitors generally cannot justify their agreement to curtail competition 
along one important dimension (namely quality), on the grounds that they still 
compete along other dimensions (such as price)’.88  
 
3.2. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
 
If the main contribution of data protection to competition law is acting as 
normative yardstick for the assessment of quality, then this is reflected in 
                                                      
86 The sharing of information can also be said to address an externality – the effects of defaults on the 
availability of credit – rather than restrictions on the competitive process, leading to the same apparent 
lack of competitive concern. See further, Pablo Ibanez-Colomo, 'Market failures, transaction costs and 
article 101(1) TFEU case law' (2012) 37 European Law Review 541. 
87 The opposite is true of restrictions by effect, which do balance different anti-competitive effects. This 
would assuage the mentioned concerns without denying the competitive value of data protection. 
88 Ezrachi and Stucke, The Curious Case of Competition and Quality’ (n72) 9. 
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exploitative abuses under Article 102 TFEU. When undertakings are insulated 
from competitive pressure they are able to use their dominant position to exploit 
consumers, in particular by charging excessive prices. As excessive prices may be 
measured by comparison with prices deemed desirable, so too, it is suggested, can 
abusive data use policies be compared with those deemed desirable in light of data 
protection rules. Data protection would therefore again act as the normative 
yardstick in assessing the quality of a data use policy. There are even advantages to 
pursuing exploitation based on quality instead of price. First, it would enable 
exploitation by ‘free’ services offered online to be brought within the scope of 
Article 102 TFEU, as providers of such services cannot be accused of excessive 
pricing.  Secondly, it would – to a certain extent89 – avoid the difficulty of having 
to offset reasonable profits (compensating for a dominant undertaking’s 
investment and risk) when determining if prices are excessive, which in turn has 
made this abuse difficult to investigate and enforce. Lastly, the argument that 
prices above the competitive level are a reward for a good or service which 
consumers value would also not apply – there is no such justification for a low 
quality data use policy.  
Finding an exploitative abuse under Article 102 TFEU based on the data 
protection regime would operate in a similar way to the finding of a restriction of 
competition under Article 101 TFEU, as outlined above. First, a data protection 
infringement would set a clear normative marker of inferior quality. If a dominant 
undertaking exploitatively reduces the quality of its data use policy, consumers will 
be worse off than had competitive levels prevailed – which, when there is 
competition on data use policy, must normatively be set at compliance with data 
protection law. Moreover, like restrictions by effect, even when there has not been 
a data protection infringement a negative effect on quality may be visible. For 
instance, in the same way that a sudden and unjustified increase in price has been 
found to be exploitative, a sudden decrease in the quality of the conditions for 
data processing might equally be exploitative.90 The extent to which a dominant 
undertaking is allowed to monetise personal data might also be considered 
exploitative if non-commensurate with the service granted to the consumer.91 
There is an added advantage to applying Article 102 TFEU in comparison to 
Article 101 TFEU: while restrictions by object involve wide normative concerns 
over the ‘proper functioning of normal competition’ that might only affect 
                                                      
89 As discussed next, this difficulty would be avoided if a data protection infringement would be present, 
but not in non-infringing exploitative monetisation. 
90 Case C-247/86, Alsatel v Novasam [1988] ECR I- 5987.  
91 See, Data Protection Commissioner, ‘Facebook Ireland – Report of Audit’, 21 December 2011, 44. 
This report states that the Commissioner‘…does not consider that it is possible using data protection 
requirements as a basis to require FB-I to deliver a free service from which members can have the right 
to opt-out completely from the means of funding it. However, there is an absolute necessity that 
members be fully aware of what information generated in their use of the service will be used for 
advertising purposes thereby allowing them to exercise choice.’ 
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consumer welfare indirectly, and in this way counter data protection concerns with 
other valid competitive interests, exploitative abuses focus directly on consumer 
welfare. 
Furthermore, precedent exists for using other areas of law as normative 
guidance on exploitative abuses, making this a promising area for the proposed 
role of data protection law. Intellectual property (IP) law is a case in point. The 
legal monopoly granted by IP law is assumed to be the reward for innovation, and 
as a result there is a general reluctance to deem prices charged for IP to be 
exploitative.92 It is often emphasised that applying competition law to IP might 
chill incentives to innovate. Nevertheless, one finds that a great number of 
excessive pricing cases have concerned IP. This paradox may be explained by the 
fact that IP law also provides normative indications of when a reward of 
monopolistic prices is adequate and when it is not. For instance, prices charged 
for licenses after the protection granted by IP law has expired have been 
considered exploitative.93 Similarly, in DSD the Court found an exploitative abuse 
when licence fees were charged but the services protected by the trademark were 
not used.94 Although not pure infringements of IP law (such as when third parties 
make unauthorised uses of IP), the reasoning underpinning these cases is clear: 
competition law is not normatively equipped to determine when the price charged 
for IP is excessive in relation to its duration and scope.95 
Perhaps the biggest challenge of allowing data protection to influence 
exploitative abuses is the impact that this would have on other areas of law, most 
notably facets of consumer protection law. Behind the conceptual clarity of 
equating a data protection infringement with the abusive exploitation of 
consumers lie significant practical consequences. The danger is that it would be as 
easy to find that an abuse of dominance by reference to multiple other areas of 
law. It could thus be argued that any rule with the aim to protect consumers could 
potentially be applied as an exploitative abuse. This could upset the balance of 
how much consumer protection is warranted and distort the purpose of Article 
102 TFEU. 
                                                      
92 The costs of producing IP usually do not reflect its value, and even if the profit seems excessive it does 
take into account the failed attempts and the incentive to achieve it. A legal monopoly might not 
correspond to a competitive one. 
93 Spreading the licences over a period larger than the intellectual property protection might be a 
legitimate pricing strategy, hence the abuse is not automatic, but further protection will usually indicate 
that the holder is attempting to leverage its current revenues into a non-protected period. 
94 Roughly speaking, trademarks guarantee the reputation of the holder, which is not at stake when its 
services are not used. T-151/01, Duales System Deutschland v Commission [2007] ECR II-01607. 
95 Prices for design rights for spare parts have also been considered open to exploitative abuses: Case C-
238/87 AB Volvo Veng v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1988] ECR 6211. This can be attributed to a hold-up 
problem, but the fact that competition law has intervened (which it does not necessary do in all hold-up 
problems) is likely due to the consideration of the purpose of design rights. 
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It must however be considered that consumer protection is not a unified 
field of law, but an assemblage of laws with each aiming to protect different 
consumer interests and triggered by differing facts. In this assemblage, it is the 
role of Article 102 TFEU to ensure that undertakings do not abuse their dominant 
position by raising prices, lowering quality or otherwise harming consumer 
welfare. This means that exploitative abuses are triggered by actions which 
negatively affect competitive parameters which should benefit consumers. As 
such, it is false to assert that any infringement of rule of consumer protection by a 
dominant undertaking would automatically lead to an exploitative abuse – Article 
102 TFEU would only be called into action by its particular trigger, which may or 
may not be present in any given scenario. The concurrent application of several 
fields of consumer protection law cannot be dismissed easily, and neither can their 
mutual normative influence. Therefore, whether dominant undertakings can be 
pursued for breaches of other fields of consumer protection depends on whether 
Article 102 TFEU’s own terms are fulfilled. 
Similar reasoning applies when considering whether exclusionary abuses are 
open to the normative influence of data protection law. As discussed above, data 
can constitute a market barrier when it is an input required for the production of 
other goods and services. These market barriers may be manipulated as part of an 
exclusionary strategy. To a large extent, such exclusionary strategies can be 
analysed by treating personal data like any other market barrier. This, as will be 
discussed, is what happens when the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position is examined in merger control. Outside merger control, competition law 
does not generally prohibit barriers to entry leading to market power – these 
barriers might simply reflect positive aspects of undertakings’ performance which 
competitors have trouble emulating. Whether the acquisition of personal data 
allowing such barriers to be erected can be equated with any other form of 
consumer goodwill or with an exclusionary strategy is the key question. Data 
protection law might be influential in answering it, by providing a normative 
judgment on the creation of a market barrier based on personal data. This issue 
will be explored by considering the test for abuse of dominance in the context of 
misleading applications for IP protection.  
In AstraZeneca96 the Court stated that it was an abuse ‘to lead the public 
authorities [to] wrongly to create regulatory obstacles to competition, for example 
by the unlawful grant of exclusive rights to the dominant undertaking’.97 If a 
market barrier was created by personal data, similar objections could be raised if 
that data was acquired on the basis of deceit –  for instance, if an undertaking 
deviated from its stated data use policy in a significant manner. It could be argued 
that, contrary to AstraZeneca, the deceit would not in this case be directed to public 
authorities. This was nevertheless a specificity of the IP at issue in AstraZeneca, as 
many other forms of protection do not require public authority intervention. 
                                                      
96 Case C-457/10, AstraZeneca v Commisson ECLI:EU:C:2012:770.  
97 ibid, [105].  
                        25/2015 
 
 24 
Extending the AstraZeneca logic to market barriers created by personal data will 
depend on whether the legal character of the barrier matters (regulatory, public 
authorities) more than its economic significance (deceit, foreclosing competitors). 
What makes the analogy feasible is that the Court reached out to IP law – in 
relation to what constituted a properly attributed exclusive right – to establish that 
the resulting barrier was outside ‘competition on the merits’.98 It is conceivable 
that a similar determination could be made in relation to personal data based on 
the data protection regime. 
The most relevant objection to such an abuse (besides its speculative 
character) relates again to the extension of the scope of Article 102 TFEU. If 
deceit were a viable basis for abuse, then it could be argued that other fields of 
consumer protection that are information-forcing – advertising, labelling, etc. – 
could lead to the same result. It must be remembered however that the basis of 
the abuse is the market barrier, starting from an analogy with the exclusive right 
granted by IP law. The information covered by these other fields is unlikely to 
constitute a market barrier. Nevertheless, if such a barrier could be equally 
established in solid economic terms, there would be nothing to prevent the 
analogy from also being pursued. In the same way that a dominant undertaking 
has no right to make deceitful declarations for the purpose of creating an IP 
market barrier, neither would it have a right to deceive in its advertising or 
labelling to similar effect. 
 
3.3. MERGER CONTROL 
 
Under the EUMR, a concentration might be prohibited (or conditions imposed 
upon it) if it leads to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The 
Commission has connected this dominant position with likely effects on 
consumer welfare, namely on the competitive parameters of price, quality, choice 
and innovation. These effects are analysed by investigating whether the 
concentration leads to the removal of competitive constraints.99 Although quality 
is thus only indirectly relevant, merger control remains an important testing 
ground for the normative influence of data protection on competition law. First, 
in contrast with the relatively untested nature of quality-based cartels or 
exploitation, negative effects on quality are expressly taken into consideration by 
merger control. Secondly, whereas it is possible to argue that competition on data 
use policy might be overlooked in cases such Asnef-Equifax, a preliminary 
reference concerned with the particular questions put before the Court, the 
                                                      
98 It is also possible that such deceit could be considered an ‘exceptional circumstances’ leading to a 
refusal to licence IP being considered abusive or integrated in circumstances similar to a so-called ‘patent 
ambush’. Case C-418/01 IMS Health [2004] ECR I-5039. 
99 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (n33) [8] and [24]-[38]. In addition, this removal might lead to greater 
transparency and parallel behaviour in the market via coordinated effects. 
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markets involved in any concentration notified to the Commission must be 
examined in full. 
If there is such a thing as quality-based competition on data use policy, it is 
therefore legitimate to ask why it has not yet been recognised in merger control. 
The Commission’s approach in Google/Doubleclick of applying data protection and 
competition law concurrently was described above. In Facebook/WhatsApp, the 
Commission reaffirmed that: 
 
‘[a]ny privacy-related concerns flowing from the increased concentration of 
data within the control of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do not fall 
within the scope of the EU competition law rules but within the scope of the 
EU data protection rules’.100 
 
This ostensibly unequivocal statement must however be considered in the context 
of the decision as a whole. The Commission did not consider personal data as an 
independent product because the parties to the merger were not deemed to be 
active in markets for the supply or treatment of such data as a commodity.101 The 
Commission only considered the ancillary use of personal data in the market for 
online advertising services.102 As such, the above statement must be understood as 
part of the debate on external constraints addressed below: the Commission is 
declining to use its competence under the EUMR to address non-competitive 
concerns. Nevertheless, there are indications that there is competition on the basis 
of the quality of data use policy throughout the Facebook/WhatsApp Decision. In 
relation to the market for consumer communications services, the Commission 
notes that: 
 
‘consumer communications apps compete for customers by attempting to 
offer the best communication experience. […] In this regard, according to 
the market investigation, important areas of improvement include: […] (ii) 
privacy and security, the importance of which varies from user to user but 
which are becoming increasingly valued, as shown by the introduction of 
consumer communications apps specifically addressing privacy and security 
issues’.103 
 
Thus, the Commission observes that after the announcement of the concentration 
many users changed services due to privacy concerns.104 Furthermore, in relation 
to the market for online advertising services, the Commission notes that the 
possibility of Facebook extending online advertising to WhatsApp would be 
                                                      
100 Facebook/WhatsApp (n8)[164] 
101 ibid, [72] 
102 ibid, [70] 
103 ibid, [87] 
104 ibid, fn. [79] and [174] 
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seriously limited by ‘dissatisfaction among the increasing number of users who 
significantly value privacy and security’.105 Thus, the Commission recognises that 
competition exists on the basis of data use policies.  
This then begs the question: why did the Commission not consider whether 
the merger would lead to a reduction of such competition? It did not do so in this 
instance as the parties were not considered to be close competitors on the market 
for consumer communication services. As such, it was not necessary to consider 
whether the merger would lead to a reduction in the quality of data use policies. In 
other words, competition for data protection quality existed but the parties to the 
merger were not engaging in it.106 The furthest the Commission goes is to 
consider (and dismiss) the competitive harm that would follow should online 
advertising be introduced to WhatsApp, or should Facebook be able to improve 
its advertising services based on WhatsApp data.107 Again, the Commission was 
only concerned with the strengthening of the dominant position on the market for 
online advertising – that is to say, by Facebook pulling ahead of its rivals – rather 
than the quality of the data use policy.108 The implications of this reasoning are 
clear: the Commission believes that there is competition on quality aspects of data 
use policies, and that consumer preferences limit the post-merger actions of the 
merged entity. However, the market power resulting from Facebook/WhatsApp did 
not raise particular competitive concerns as the Commission found no 
overlapping competitive activity.  
One could conclude that data protection provides no normative influence in 
this regard: the Commission acts no differently in Facebook/WhatsApp than in 
numerous other concentrations. Once the Commission relegates (in its view, non-
competitive) data protection concerns to the separate application of data 
protection law, it then appears to assess the negative effects on the quality of data 
protection through purely economic methods of gauging consumer preferences. 
However, an alternative reading of this Decision is suggested. Facebook/WhatsApp 
examines negative effects for consumers along the normative lines drawn in the 
data protection regime, namely the concerns about data protection and privacy 
which, by the Commission’s own admission, influence competition. Without data 
protection, it would be harder for competition law to ascertain whether those 
effects are truly negative: for example, it could be considered that consumers 
would always benefit from more targeted advertising. Indeed, outside the legal 
framework of data protection the notions of ‘privacy’ and ‘data protection’ would 
prove normatively empty for the purposes competition law. The fact nevertheless 
remains that the Commission does not consider those effects directly, but only 
                                                      
105 ibid, fn. [174] 
106 Indeed, one of the reasons why the Commission determined that they were not competing was 
because of their different privacy policies, ibid, fn. [102] 
107 ibid, fn. [167] 
108 ibid, [187] 
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indirectly through the analysis of market power. In the end, Facebook/WhatsApp 
appears inconclusive: without concerns about market power, the Commission did 
not have to investigate negative effects in more detail and provide further 
guidance on the loss of quality of data protection. This ends up being quite similar 
to the lack of competitive concerns which was seen above to have prevented 
further inquiry into a restriction by object in Asnef-Equifax. 
If ever a merger involving competition on data use policy raises concerns 
about a dominant position then the normative influence of the data protection 
regime will undoubtedly be easier to ascertain. Yet, it is suggested that 
Facebook/WhatsApp also provided the Commission with the opportunity to take 
data protection concerns into account from another perspective. It must be 
remembered that the creation or strengthening of a dominant undertaking is only 
a ‘particular’ concern covered by the Merger Regulation.109 In Tetra Laval the 
Court found that, in examining a merger, the Commission was justified in 
considering past abusive behaviour by one of the parties to the merger and 
requiring corresponding commitments.110 As the Court stated explicitly, it is not 
the sole role of the Commission under the EUMR to prevent the creation and 
strengthening of a dominant position; the Commission must also consider the 
incentives for the abuse of such position post-merger.111 This would also apply if, 
as discussed above, data protection could influence the finding of an exploitative 
abuse. As such, even if there are reasons to dismiss concerns about a dominant 
position in Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission could have been obliged to 
explore whether one of the parties would further exploit its consumers. An 
infringement of the data protection regime could therefore affect merger control 
beyond the assessment of the dominant position of the merged entity. This is 
another reason why a merger leading to a data protection infringement could 
make the Commission reconsider its position on concurrent application. 
 
 
 
4. DATA PROTECTION AS AN EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT ON 
COMPETITION LAW 
 
When examining the ways in which data protection law could be incorporated in 
the existing analytical framework of competition law, and thereby exert an internal 
constraint, the fundamental right character of data protection has not been taken 
into consideration. This section will consider whether, beyond the pre-existing 
confines of competition analysis, data protection can influence the interpretation 
and enforcement of competition law. As already stated, the Charter introduces a 
                                                      
109 Merger Regulation (n30) Art. 2(3). 
110 C–12/03 Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I–987. This involved discrimination, which is not an 
issue where normative influence of data protection is likely to play out. 
111 ibid, [159].  
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right to privacy and data protection in the EU legal order. The Charter is 
addressed to the ‘institutions and bodies of the Union’ and also to the Member 
States when ‘implementing EU law’.112  Moreover, although the horizontal effect 
of the Charter has been disputed (as the Charter is only explicitly addressed to the 
EU Institutions and Member States), the Court affirmed in AMS113 that the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law are ‘applicable in all the situations 
governed by EU law’.114 In that case the relevant Charter right was not given 
horizontal effect as the Court held that in order for it to be fully effective it had to 
be given ‘more specific expression in European Union or national law’.115 The 
right to data protection has already been given such specific expression in EU 
secondary legislation, through the Directive, and in national law through 
implementing legislation. There is therefore no obstacle to the application of the 
right to data protection between private parties. Indeed, this follows from the 
Court’s reasoning in the case of Google Spain where it assessed Google’s 
responsibilities as a data controller in light of the rights to data protection and 
privacy, thereby ensuring the horizontal application of these rights.116 
The Charter rights to privacy and data protection are thus binding on the 
Commission when exercising any of its competences, and on private parties when 
acting within the scope of EU law. When considering this, it is necessary to bear 
in mind the distinction between positive and negative obligations pursuant to 
fundamental rights law. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
repeatedly held that the right to respect for private life may ‘involve the adoption 
of measures designed to ensure respect for private life even in the sphere of the 
relations of individuals themselves’.117 Such positive obligations ensure that certain 
fundamental rights provide protection by the State in addition to the widely 
recognised protection from the State.118 Thus, it is suggested that the external 
constraints of data protection on competition law could be formulated as negative 
and positive obligations. First, data protection could impose a negative obligation 
to limit certain private arrangements from falling within the scope of competition 
law, in order to respect the parties’ rights to privacy and data protection (4.1.). 
Secondly, data protection could place a positive obligation on the Commission to 
promote the effective application of the right to data protection (4.2.). 
 
                                                      
112 Art 51(1) EU Charter.  
113 Case C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and ors ECLI:EU:C:2014:2.  
114 ibid, [42].  
115 ibid, [45].  
116 Google Spain (n13).  
117 See, for instance, X & Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235, [23]. 
118 See further, Andrew Clapham, ‘The “Drittwirkung” of the Convention’ in R St J McDonald, F 
Matscher, and H Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 163, 190.  
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4.1. RESTRICTION OF THE SCOPE OF COMPETITION LAW 
 
The primary way in which competition law can be constrained by an external 
norm is by preventing its application and thereby reducing its scope. Competition 
law is sometimes constrained in this way by its interaction with other areas of EU 
law, either explicitly in the Treaties or because of an implicit incompatibility of 
goals. An example of explicit exclusion is Article 106(2) TFEU, which provides 
that undertakings entrusted with public service obligations (or ‘services of general 
economic interest’) will only be subject to competition law to the extent that this 
does not obstruct the performance of their particular task. Albany is an example of 
an implicit exclusion, with the Court considering that social policy objectives 
would be undermined if collective labour agreements were subject to Article 
101(1) TFEU.119 It is suggested that data protection’s status as a fundamental right 
would give it the required legal precedence to operate in the latter fashion, and 
exclude the application of competition law altogether if necessary. Nevertheless, 
the commonality of goals between data protection and competition law, as well as 
the concurrent application suggested by the Court in Asnef-Equifax, does not point 
to a solution such as that in Albany. Rather, it is suggested that data protection law 
could prevent the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (subject to a 
proportionality judgment), in a similar vein to Article 106(2) TFEU and to the 
Wouters120 case law discussed below.121  
Data protection law could thus operate like a justification for restrictions of 
competition or abuses of dominance.122 In Wouters the Court held that a ban of 
the association between lawyers and accountants stemming from self-regulation of 
the legal profession restricted competition, but ultimately did not breach Article 
101 TFEU since it ensured that ‘the ultimate consumers of legal services and the 
sound administration of justice are provided with the necessary guarantees in 
relation to integrity and experience’.123 This jurisprudence was subsequently 
extended to restrictions necessary to enforce doping bans in Meca-Medina, where 
the Court expressly stated that such restrictions had to be proportionate to the 
objectives pursued.124 While the interpretation of Wouters remains controversial, 
                                                      
119 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, [59].  
120 Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I-1577. 
121 The distinction between justification and a restrictive interpretation of the conditions of Article 101 
TFEU is admittedly fine, as shown by FENIN (Case C-205/03, FENIN v Commission [2006] ECR I-6295, 
[27]) in relation to the notion of undertaking and the German books case in relation to the effect on trade 
between Member States criterion (German books Press Release IP/02/461, 22 March 2002). Wouters itself, 
by stating that not all restrictions of freedom of action fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU and 
referencing the context usually considered by restrictions of competition, could also be read in this latter 
way.  Wouters (n120) [97]. 
122 Objective justifications for an abuse of dominance have been admitted by the Court but none has yet 
been they applied, so the present discussion will concentrate on the Wouters case law. 
123 Wouters (n120) [97].  
124 Case C-519/04P David Meca Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission (2006) ECR I-6991, [45].  
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the proportionality test made explicit in Meca-Medina points towards the 
introduction of a rule of reason in competition law similar to the one applied in 
internal market law.125 Since the seminal Cassis de Dijon judgment, Member States 
may invoke overriding public policy objectives, ranging from the protection of the 
environment to public health, in order to justify what would otherwise constitute 
an interference with the Treaty free movement provisions. The scene had already 
been set for such a development in competition law in Deliege126, a case involving 
both internal market and competition law, when Advocate General Cosmas noted 
that ‘rules which, at first sight, reduce competition, but are necessary precisely in 
order to enable market forces to function or secure some other legitimate aim, 
should not be regarded as infringing [competition law].’127 Moreover, in Pierre 
Fabre128 the Court made an explicit comparison between a ‘legitimate aim’ pursued 
by a restriction in competition law and an overriding public policy objective 
accepted in internal market law.129  
Interpreting the Wouters case law in this way would facilitate the inclusion of 
data protection law amongst the public policy justifications for what would 
otherwise be a breach of competition law. The protection of fundamental rights 
has long been accepted as a justification in internal market jurisprudence. In 
Omega130 the Court considered that a ban on a laser game simulating human killing 
breached the freedom to provide services, but accepted that such a ban was 
justified as it violated the right to human dignity. In so doing, the Court noted that 
human dignity is a general principle of law which the EU legal order ‘undeniably 
strives to ensure respect for’.131 The recognition that the protection of 
fundamental rights may constitute a valid justification for a breach of internal 
market law is a further indication that EU law’s regulation of economic activity is 
subject to fundamental rights constraints. It is therefore argued that a restriction 
of competition necessary to protect fundamental rights could not fall foul of 
Article 101 TFEU. Indeed, Monti suggests that, in Wouters, ‘the Court was duty 
bound to deploy a solution that would ensure that the public policy of the 
Member State is given equal relevance regardless of the means by which the policy 
is implemented (i.e. by legislation or private party conduct)’.132 This reasoning 
applies more forcibly if the policy does not originate in a Member State but is an 
obligation imposed by the Charter.  
                                                      
125 Giorgio Monti, Article 81 EC and public policy (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 1057.  
126 Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549.  
127 Monti, Article 81 and public policy (n125) 1088. 
128 Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SA [2011] ECR I-9419.  
129 ibid [43-44] 
130 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn 
[2004] ECR I-9609. 
131 ibid, [34].  
132 Monti, Article 81 and public policy (n125)1089 
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Yet, it is suggested that the use of data protection in this way – to justify what 
would otherwise be anticompetitive conduct – may not be very widespread. This 
is because data protection legislation already applies horizontally between private 
parties. Since undertakings are compelled to respect the legislation implementing 
the Directive, undertakings could rely on the State compulsion doctrine in order 
to justify breaches of competition law required by data protection.133 Nevertheless, 
some actions by undertakings might seek to facilitate the effectiveness of data 
protection without their omission constituting an infringement. Those actions, in 
turn, might be considered anti-competitive and therefore require justification. This 
is not a hypothetical scenario. The preliminary opinion of the EDPS explores 
several measures that would favour the control of users over their personal data, 
such as ‘standards for transparency and intelligibility of contractual terms in online 
services’ and a ‘right to data portability [allowing] users to transfer between online 
services’.134 Although the EDPS is confident that these measures would increase 
competition, any standardisation effort runs the risk of allowing undertakings to 
align their behaviour and stifle innovation. Thus, undertakings engaging in 
industry agreements with the purpose of standardising contractual terms or 
technical requirements in order to facilitate data portability may find themselves 
subject to an allegation of infringement of Article 101 TFEU. Assessing whether 
such an infringement is present would involve an examination of whether the 
choice afforded by portability outweighed the long-term effects of aligning data 
use conditions. As litigation over standardisation of other economic activities 
indicates, this assessment might not look favourably on industry efforts. In such 
circumstance, a justification based on the Wouters doctrine could provide a much 
needed, and simple, solution. 
 
4.2. GUARANTEEING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION 
 
As an EU institution to which the Charter rights to privacy and data protection 
are addressed, the Commission is under a positive obligation to promote the 
effectiveness of these fundamental rights. This positive obligation is respected, in 
part, if data protection is allowed to act as an internal constraint on competition 
law. By resorting to data protection as a normative yardstick, the Commission will 
undoubtedly be contributing to the effectiveness of the right to data protection. 
That obligation is further complied with if competition law applies independently 
of the normative influence of data protection but still achieves results that further 
data protection concerns, such as preventing discrimination between users or the 
accumulation of market power that can be leveraged by undertakings in 
compelling users to disclose data. This shows the normative coherence of EU law, 
as areas with common goals reinforce each other. 
                                                      
133 Joined Cases C-359/95 and C-379/95, Commission of the European Communities and French Republic v 
Ladbroke Racing Ltd. (Ladbroke Racing) [1997] ECR I-6265, [33]. 
134 Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS (n10) [26] and [83]. 
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The obligation to guarantee the effectiveness of the right to data protection 
can nevertheless go further, and externally condition the enforcement of 
competition law. Such external conditioning would depart from competition law’s 
internal logic and demand an added consideration of data protection concerns. In 
principle, this does not seem feasible given the Commission’s stated policy of 
applying data protection and competition law separately. Thus, DG Competition 
(the directorate general of the Commission in charge of competition matters) has 
refused to investigate the consequences of applying data protection law to the 
competitive issues it handles. This policy nevertheless means that the DG 
Competition might be confronted with competitive actions by undertakings that 
imperil the right to data protection but refuse to take positive action. As just seen, 
there are strong indications that this separation does not apply to negative action: 
under the Wouters case law, DG Competition would have to accept data protection 
as a valid restriction of the scope of competition law. Thus, by refusing to take 
more proactive measures, the Commission as a whole may equally fall short of its 
obligation to ensure the effectiveness of fundamental rights protection. 
Any such positive obligation would not however be unlimited: it could not 
require DG Competition to exercise its investigative and sanctioning powers due 
to an equally strong limitation by the principle of legality. If DG Competition 
pursued data protection infringements as competition law infringements simply 
because they involved an agreement or an undertaking in a dominant position 
(and not because it would be constrained to do so by the internal logic of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU), it would be usurping the competences it was attributed by 
EU law and inadmissibly expanding the remit of competition law. The status of 
data protection as a fundamental right is not liable to change this, since the use of 
competition law sanctions to guarantee the right to data protection would also 
breach the principle of legality as set out in Article 7 of the ECHR.135 Without a 
competition law ‘hook’, DG Competition cannot pursue undertakings. The 
complaint to DG Competition by ‘Disconnect’, the provider of a privacy and 
security enhancing application for smartphones and devices, may be a case in 
point.136 In that complaint, Disconnect suggests that it has been excluded from 
the Android Operating System’s Google Play store. Unless it can be demonstrated 
that this exclusion is discriminatory or exclusionary under the logic of Article 102 
TFEU (notably, that the Google Play store is an essential facility) it is unlikely that 
this complaint will be successful despite the potentially negative impact of 
Google’s policy on the effectiveness of individual data protection and privacy 
rights. In the absence of regulation or the relevant criteria for an Article 102 
                                                      
135 A. Menarini Diagnostics srl v. Italy, App. No 43509/08, not yet reported, 27 September 2011.  
136 Wall Street Journal, ‘App Maker Files EU Complaint Against Google, Alleging Abuse of Android 
Dominance’, 1 June 2015: http://www.wsj.com/articles/app-maker-files-eu-complaint-against-google-
alleging-abuse-of-android-dominance-1433204706, accessed 2 November 2015.  
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TFEU investigation, if DG Competition intervened in such an instance it would 
be acting beyond the scope of its powers.  
This limitation nevertheless does not negate the Commission’s obligation to 
ensure that, when acting in the field of competition law, its actions promote the 
effectiveness of data protection rules. This is evident in the obligation, stated at 
the outset, on the Commission to respect the right to data protection in its 
investigations of competition law. What is further suggested is that the 
Commission should guarantee the effectiveness of the right to data protection by 
ensuring that its competences are not (mis)used in a manner which hinders the 
effective application of data protection law. That would notably be the case if the 
Commission is asked to confer a benefit on an undertaking (or undertakings) in 
the context of a competition law assessment that would diminish the effectiveness 
of the right to data protection. In such circumstances, the Commission should 
withhold the benefit until it becomes apparent that, by conferring it, it would 
comply with the positive obligation to respect the right. This would not unduly 
expand the scope of competition law, as there would always be a competitive 
concern triggering it. The exercise of the Commission’s competences would 
simply be subject to a positive obligation to guarantee the effectiveness of the 
right to data protection, in the same way it is already unquestionably subject to a 
negative obligation to refrain from infringing this right itself. Any failure to 
comply with these obligations would be reflected in the validity of a Commission 
decision. 
In its Google Spain judgment, the Court placed significant emphasis on the 
need to ensure the effectiveness of EU data protection law when interpreting the 
provisions of the Directive.137 For instance, when stating that Google may be 
under an obligation to remove links from its index, the Court noted that the 
effective and complete protection of individuals could not be guaranteed if these 
individuals were obliged to have this information also erased from the initial host 
publisher.138 Thus, the effectiveness of the data protection regime requires private 
parties to do what they can within their sphere of action, regardless of other 
avenues of enforcement. If a private party can be obliged to act in this manner, it 
is arguable that an EU Institution would be under an equally strong, if not 
stronger, duty to promote the effectiveness of the rights addressed to it. This 
could curtail the Commission’s usual discretion in exercising its competences to 
apply competition law.139  
                                                      
137 Google Spain (n13)[30], [34], [38], [53], [58] and [84]. 
138 Google Spain (n13) [84].  
139 In its Schrems judgment, the Court recognised that the discretion of the Commission is limited when 
making an assessment under the Data Protection Directive regarding the adequacy of the protection 
offered by a third-country. The reason offered by the Court in that case was that the protection of 
personal data plays an important role in the protection of private life and that the Commission’s adequacy 
assessment might have an impact on the fundamental rights of a large number of individuals. Case C-
362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.  
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Merger control would provide the prime example of how such exercise may 
diminish the effectiveness of the right to data protection. When the Commission 
clears a merger, it is not putting an end to a sanctioning procedure: it is granting 
the parties to the concentration the authorisation to go ahead with an operation 
which would otherwise lack effect.140 As discussed above, the Commission may 
consider the impact that a concentration may have on the quality for data use 
policies if such competition exists. However, it is also suggested that the right to 
data protection can lead to a further parallel assessment of the impact of the 
merger on data protection regardless of data use policies being a competitive 
parameter. Thus, the Commission could be required to withhold its decision on a 
concentration until satisfied that merger clearance would not breach, or detract 
from the effectiveness, of the right to data protection.141 This would be especially 
relevant in the context of mergers given the particular privacy and data protection 
concerns which the amalgamation of data sets entail. As also noted by the EDPS, 
personal data reveals more than the sum of its parts.142 Therefore, in a merger 
context, by allowing two companies to combine previously separate data sets, the 
information gained about the individual may be far more revealing than if these 
data sets are separately maintained.143 This is often why such mergers have an 
‘added value’ from a commercial perspective: they may provide a 
(disproportionate) insight into the life and interests of the individual.  
A positive obligation would also apply where the Commission imposes 
conditions to clear a merger or accepts commitments from an undertaking to end 
an investigation under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. On the one hand, the 
Commission would not be able to suggest a merger condition or accept a 
commitment that would require the undertakings to violate, or undermine, data 
protection law. This may seem evident, yet the sharing of personal data is often 
suggested as a remedy to claims of market power when only one entity has control 
over a large personal data set.144 However, it must be borne in mind that if 
                                                      
140 Merger Regulation (n30) Art 7(1).  
141 A similar situation could be envisaged in relation to an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU insofar 
as it also grants the benefit of validity to agreements that would otherwise be null and void due to Article 
101(2) TFEU. 
142 Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS (n10) [9]. 
143 The EDPS suggests that merger control should consider the impact on consumer welfare of the 
amalgamation of data ‘in the event that the combined [personal data] were later processed for 
incompatible purposes’, Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS (n10) [30]. However, undue processing should 
not be assumed to automatically follow from amalgamation or from any large aggregation of personal 
data, either as part competitive analysis (the reason why the Court considered previous discrimination by 
one of the merging parties as grounds for possible future abuse Tetra-Laval) or to guarantee the 
effectiveness of the right to data protection (since undertakings should not be presumed to infringe data 
protection simply because they have ample opportunity). 
144 The EDPS even shows concern that data protection might serve as a ‘shield’ against such remedies, 
Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS (n10) [31]. 
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consent has been relied upon as a legal basis for the personal data processing, any 
such transfer would be subject to the renewal of this consent.145 Moreover, 
transfers of personal data between undertakings must respect the principle of 
purpose limitation. Pursuant to this principle, data collected for one purpose 
should not be processed for another incompatible purpose. For example, if 
personal data is collected by a social networking site it might not be possible to 
transfer them to the provider of a mobile phone application. Even if both are 
competitors from a competition law perspective, from the perspective of the 
individual the purposes of the data processing may – depending on a context-
specific assessment – be incompatible. 
On the other hand, the extent to which the Commission can require an 
undertaking to take steps to address data protection concerns as part of the 
commitments offered by undertakings is debatable.146 Clearly, guaranteeing the 
effectiveness of the right to data protection is not part of the competition law 
infringement which the commitments are supposed to address.147 The Court has 
nonetheless accepted that commitments may go beyond this infringement and 
lead to structural reform of the market, prompting criticism that the Commission 
is expanding its powers for regulatory purposes.148 Introducing data protection 
concerns would exacerbate these objections. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, 
as in the context of merger clearance, the Commission materially confers a benefit 
when accepting commitments from undertakings and is under a positive 
obligation to guarantee the effectiveness of the right of data protection. Thus, the 
Commission should go further than refusing to accept remedies that infringe that 
right, and also require that commitments offered by undertakings do not detract 
from the right’s effectiveness. This will not unduly extend the scope of 
competition law as long as remedies are limited to those otherwise admitted (no 
matter how flawed) as commitments.  
It could be argued that the described emphasis on effectiveness, as well as the 
Court’s finding that the Commission’s discretion is limited when the right to data 
protection is at stake, applies only when the EU’s data protection rules are at issue 
and thus should not impact on the activities of DG Competition. However, it is 
submitted here that there is a general obligation on the Commission to ensure, at 
minimum, that any of its decisions do not detract on the effectiveness of the right 
to data protection. This obligation follows from the collegiate nature of 
Commission decision-making and from the new structure of the Commission. 
First of all, the Commission is bound to ‘act collectively’ in accordance with the 
                                                      
145 This follows from the specificity criterion in the notion of consent. Directive 95/46 (n5) Art 7(a).  
146 The EDPS considers several remedies ‘which address the harm to individuals’ privacy’ that might fall 
under this category insofar as they are not directly related to a competitive harm, Preliminary Opinion of 
the EDPS (n10) [32].  
147 Monti, Article 81 and public policy (n125)1076.  
148 C-441/07, Commission v Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949. See generally, Niamh Dunne, 'Commitment 
Decisions in EU Competition Law' (2014) 10(2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 399.  
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Rules of Procedure of the Commission149, which state that ‘Commission decisions 
shall be adopted if a majority of the number of Members specified in the Treaty 
vote in favour’. Therefore, for instance, while the decision to grant clearance to a 
merger may emanate from DG Competition, it must be approved by the 
Commission as a collective unit. Furthermore, since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Commission President may appoint a Vice-President with 
responsibility for, inter alia, ensuring respect for the rule of law and the Charter. 
One practical consequence of this new horizontal cross-cutting role could be to 
ensure that fundamental rights, including the right to data protection, are taken 
into account in implementing policies and activities, and, crucially, in Commission 
decision-making. In this context, the Commission would simply be ensuring that 
one of its decisions – to clear a merger or accept commitments – would not 
breach the right to data protection, or jeopardise its effective application. Indeed, 
it could be argued that this is not a choice for the Commission, rather it is an 
obligation stemming from the Charter. 
The objections to such a role for the Commission are predictable. The most 
obvious argument is in the line of Easterbrook’s observation that ‘when 
everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive’.150 It might be argued that 
introducing data protection concerns in the application of competition law is a 
slippery slope: why not then incorporate other fundamental rights such as those 
binding anti-discrimination, labour relations, and so on. It is suggested in response 
that if such Commission intervention is justified in the data protection context, it 
should not be withheld simply because this would also force the Commission to 
protect other rights. On the contrary, the common characteristics of data 
protection and competition law might make this intervention more appropriate 
than regarding other rights. The fact remains however that either the Commission 
is bound by fundamental rights, or it is not: the wording of the Charter explicitly 
affirms that it is. 
A second objection might be that the assessment of the impact on the right 
to data protection would be beyond the sphere of expertise of DG Competition. 
The Commission has objected to the inclusion of non-competition assessments 
within its remit for over a decade. For instance, in a White Paper dating from 
1999, it stated that the purpose of Article 101(3) TFEU is to ‘provide a legal 
framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow 
the application of competition rules to be set aside because of political 
considerations’.151 This problem can be avoided by recognising that this 
assessment would be an external non-competition assessment, not an internal 
interference with the logic of competition law. Article 21 of the EUMR already 
                                                      
149  Rules of Procedure of the Commission [2000] OJ L308/26).  
150  Frank H. Easterbrook, ‘Limits of Antitrust’ (1984) 63 Texas Law Review 1, 12.  
151 Commission, White paper on modernization of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 [1999] OJ 
C132/1, [57].  
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allows for such non-competition assessments by Member States in certain 
circumstances, for instance in order to safeguard media plurality. It is thus 
suggested that the Commission would be required to uphold the right to data 
protection through a similar non-competition assessment. One might question 
why this would fall to the Commission rather than the Member State: the answer 
is clear, the Commission has the competence to act in the data protection context, 
visible through data protection legislation (while it does not have this competence 
to safeguard the right to freedom of expression). One might also question how 
this power of the Commission might be exercised in practice. Here, it is suggested 
that a set of indicators are devised (similar, in concept, to the Commission’s 
existing media plurality indicators) in order to guide Commission action in this 
sphere. From an institutional perspective, the EDPS, an independent body tasked 
with ensuring that the EU institutions respect the right to data protection and data 
protection legislation, would be well placed to advise on suitable cases where such 
a non-competition assessment would be required.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The multiple internal and external constraints mapped out in this article indicate 
that, simply put, data protection law should matter for the application of 
competition law. This influence extends beyond the Commission respecting data 
protection law when conducting its investigations or considering it as part of the 
legal and economic context of markets for personal data. A separate and 
concurrent application of data protection and competition law is easy to defend 
when, like in Asnef-Equifax and Facebook/WhatsApp, there is no data protection 
infringement in sight. However, if ever such an infringement was present, it would 
be difficult to ignore. How can competition fail to be harmed if undertakings 
collude on the conditions offered to acquire personal data, if undertakings take 
advantage of their dominant position to impose detrimental conditions on 
consumers, or if mergers that can lead to these effects are cleared? How can the 
Commission purport to respect its obligation to protect fundamental rights if it 
turns a blind eye to violations of the right to data protection?  
Nevertheless, it is not a foregone conclusion that data protection law will 
ever matter for competition law, as appearances can be maintained and formalism 
strictly enforced. If ever cases of collusion, abuse or merger control are decided 
based on the quality of data use policies, this quality can be assessed without an 
express reference to data protection law – even though competition law lacks the 
normative tools and has otherwise been receptive to deferring such competitive 
assessments to other fields of law. In the same manner, the Commission can 
continue to deny any responsibility for the effectiveness of the right of data 
protection by narrowing its inquiry to competitive concerns and pointing to the 
positive externalities that such enforcement creates for data protection law. 
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Keeping data protection and competition law in separate silos has all the 
advantages of perpetuating the status quo. 
Data protection might even welcome that status quo and reject influence over 
competition law. It is unclear whether, by facilitating the free flow of personal 
data, the Data Protection Directive sought to encourage markets where personal 
data itself would be the object of market transactions. Indeed, legal and ethical 
concerns have been expressed about the commodification of personal data. By 
not granting individuals property rights over their personal data, but instead 
merely rights akin to a license, it is arguable that such markets were neither 
envisaged nor desired at the time when the EU data protection rules were drafted. 
Applying competition law to those markets might thus serve as official recognition 
of an unwarranted development. Nevertheless, it seems inevitable that, as with 
other goods involving personality rights (such as the products of freedom of 
expression or image rights), the market integration concerns underlying data 
protection law would attract the application of competition law insofar as both 
regulate economic activity. There is nonetheless a risk particular to personal data: 
while the duality of economic value and personal significance of other personality 
rights is well established, the border between the two concerns still needs to be 
drawn in the context of the (relatively new) right to data protection. The 
commodification of data protection might unduly push that border towards 
economic concerns. However, it is suggested that competition law is more likely 
to clarify than to harm this definition. 
By only applying when there is competition on the quality of data use policies 
– and backing that analysis with tried and tested economic methods –, 
competition law can illuminate which aspects of data protection are better left to 
the market and those which, due to information asymmetries and biases, can only 
depend on regulation. Meaningful competition on data use policy would 
undoubtedly benefit consumers. It may be argued that such competition is 
currently incipient, and that consumers are powerless to implement it. 
Nevertheless, the digital revolution is slowly but steadily encouraging informed 
digital users, and competition law must protect their interests. The application of 
competition law does not preclude adequate ethical regulation of personal data 
markets by data protection, as well as the control of their negative externalities on 
non-competitive concerns. Moreover, as data protection law may influence 
competition law, so too can the reverse happen to the benefit of data protection 
law: loosely defined concepts such as the ‘legitimate interests pursued by the data 
controller’ or the purpose limitation on the treatment of data could benefit from 
considering the competitive reality facing undertakings, while the validity and 
scope of consent and the ‘the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
data subject’ could also be adapted to the market power of the data controller.152 
                                                      
152 The EDPS also explored this possibility, see Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS (n10) [35]. 
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Given this unease regarding the commodification of personal data, it is ironic 
that competition law scholars may assume that data protection’s influence will 
have the opposite effect: unduly shifting competition law towards non-
competitive concerns. At present DG Competition has been shown little appetite 
to embrace its positive obligations under the Charter. There is admittedly the 
danger that such positive obligations could tip the enforcement of competition 
law towards full-fledged regulation: all aspects of a market, competitive or not, 
would come within DG Competition’s remit. Perhaps the general acceptance of 
the Commission’s sizeable powers in the area of competition law is predicated on 
their purely economic character, and would quickly become contested if used to 
pursue other goals. Several safeguards have been discussed in this article which 
can avert this danger. Nonetheless, critics will inevitably see any concern by the 
Commission over fundamental rights protection by undertakings as opening the 
proverbial Pandora’s box. These critics might be as late to prevent it as in the 
myth. The Lisbon Treaty and the Charter have irreversibly changed the obligations 
which the Commission is subject to in relation to the protection of fundamental 
rights. As Pandora’s box also contained hope, data protection’s constraint over 
competition law may provide the opportunity to best clarify these obligations. 
 
